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BOOK REVIEWS
TAX CREDITS AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS, by James A. Maxwell, The Brookings Institution, Washington,
D.C., 1962, 167 pages. Price: $3.75.
This study of techniques of federal-state revenue "sharing" provides
useful, economic analysis which is not designed, apparently, to be controversial. Indeed, The Brookings Institution, which supported, directed, and published the study, is a private foundation having the purpose of providing
studies of the problems of the federal government. Here no particular position
is directly advocated-no sides are taken. What is controversial about this
study is not what is said, but what is left unsaid.
The problem that ostensibly forms the basis for the study is the demand
of state and local governments for additional revenues. Most states now
rely upon the sales tax as a major source of revenue because the federal
government has fairly well pre-empted the income tax field. After the state
government pre-empts the more obvious excise taxes (gasoline, cigarettes,
liquor), the local governments are left to their ingenuity.' This ingenuity,
along with the limited size of the remaining taxable areas, often produces a
proliferation of local taxes which produce little revenue, are difficult to administer, and have high compliance costs.
For an answer to this problem, James A. Maxwell, who is Professor of
Economics at Clark University, has considered various devices for keeping
some of the "federal revenues" at the state and local levels. These devices
include tax crediting, tax deducting, conditional grants, unconditional grants,
and tax sharing. 2 Tax crediting, or the reduction of the federal liability by
8
the state tax payment receives primary emphasis. Tax deducting, or the
reduction of the federal tax base by the state tax payment, as in the income
tax, also receives extensive treatment. The prevailing theme of the work,
however, is the application of these devices for the accomplishment of con1. Anyone familiar with the scope of the so-called "Tax Anything Act," PA. STAT.
(Supp. 1962), knows the range over which local tax ingenuity
can roam.
2. Tax sharing as a device deserves closer attention, particularly as a means of
ending local taxing authority conflicts. One small version of this is already in operation
in Pennsylvania in the form of joint tax authorities. The problem is of larger proportions for transient enterprises, such as contracting, than is realized and the joint
tax authority is only a partial solution. Tax sharing might well provide an answer
and increase local tax revenues.
3. Presumably, this is because the device has historical perspective in the unemployment insurance field.
ANN. tit. 53, § 6851
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gressional purposes, an approach which has no direct relationship to existing state and local revenue needs. These purposes can include socioeconomic
reform considerations using a coercive tax credit or conditional grants, tax
base considerations between industrial and marketing economies, and distribution of wealth considerations involving the formula and technique of
distribution as well as the choice of device.
The basic issue of intergovernmental fiscal relations is not whether there
should be a division of tax revenues but how the division should be made.
The problem of the manner of the division is, of course, closely allied with
the problem of the division of labor, namely, governmental services, for that
is the purpose of the governmental funds. Professor Maxwell does recognize
the basic issue, for in the first chapter he poses the question of the existence
of federal fiscal responsibility to state and local governments. 4 However,
Professor Maxwell merely poses the question and promises to examine it
in the later chapters, but the later examinations are in the same terms as
the final paragraph: congressional purpose in allocating its money. This
emphasis upon congressional purpose as the determinative factor for choice
of device does not reflect the initial purpose for the study. State and local
needs for revenue have increased along with the cost of services, the expanded
applicability of existing services, and the variety of new services. It is
a great leap, though, from the general revenue needs of state and local governments, outlined in the first chapter, to the congressional choice among difering federal policy-effecting devices described in the concluding paragraph:
Philosophers have observed that life is richer than logic, and,
by an obvious parallel, the armory of devices examined here defies
simple and categorical appraisal. Intergovernmental financial cooperation can be advanced by many devices, and, so long as illogic is
avoided in their construction, the devices should be appraised in the
light of the objectives which the Congress has in mind. Tax credits,
for instance, can be utilized to advance tax coordination and to provide financial resources for state governments, and only by misuse
might they be framed so as to aggravate tax conflict or so as to
be dissipated in tax reduction. But tax credits do not provide for
equalization, and they tend to be inflexible. If equalization is to be
emphasized, the appropriate device is the unconditional grant; if
stimulus to specific governmental functions, the conditional grant.
Since federal objectives in assisting state and local governments are
manifold, there is no inconsistency in logical use of several devices.5
This final paragraph of the concluding chapter sums up not only the
excellent economic analysis of the study, but its political and legal short4.
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comings as well. The factors causing the state and local revenue squeeze
are not examined in detail. Has the need, real or imagined, for governmental services outstripped the available revenue? Is there an overlapping
or duplicating of services? Should there be a reallocation of responsibilities?
Should there be a reallocation of existing revenues? Professor Maxwell is
content to leave these problems to congressional investigation and debate,
a procedure of little comfort to state officers. For example, the study carefully describes the use of federal coercion through tax credits in the unemployment insurance field and the estate tax field. In the former the objective
was socioeconomic reform and in the latter the neutralization of state action
designed to attract the wealthy, who were expected to leave large estates.
Also, the implementation of policy is demonstrated by the manner in which
Congress has made home ownership desirable by allowing the deduction of
property taxes and mortgage interest. The implicit assumption of the study
is that Congress should be the final arbiter perhaps because the money or
taxing power initially "belongs" to the federal government. In any event,
the continuing coercive power of the federal government in the unemployment
insurance field, coupled with the reneging of Congress in the estate tax field,
indicates at least some feeling of federal tax superiority. The study's reliance
upon the motivation of Congress is disquieting and the inability to choose
among devices except on a political basis is disturbing-provided, of course,
that the real interest is to supply additional funds to state and local governments for general needs.
Author Maxwell has given us basic information about the economic significance of the available choices, and through economics he derives the uses,
advantages, and disadvantages of each choice. Professor Maxwell is quite
correct that each device has peculiar advantages and disadvantages, and his
discussion of them is excellent. As such a study, the book is an invaluable
blueprint once the legal and political assumptions are made. It may be
unfair to criticize the book for what it does not say, but what it does not
say appears to have been carefully avoided, either to avoid political overtones
or to avoid non-economic digressions. It is, however, the political overtones
and noneconomic considerations which are of prime importance, since without the perspective which they give to the device chosen, no true measurement of the tax relief to state and local governments can be made. As an
economic study of policy-implementing devices, removed from the problem
of the relationship of state and local revenues to federal taxation, the work
RICHARD C. Fox*
is complete.
* B.A., 1956, University of Rochester; J.D., 1961, University of Chicago Law
School; member, Dauphin County and Pennsylvania Bar Associations; associated
with the firm of McNees, Wallace & Nurick, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A WORLD VIEW, by James Avery
Joyce, Grove Press, Inc., New York, 1962, 288 pages. Price: $1.95.
James Avery Joyce, a British author, barrister, lecturer, and teacher,
has written widely on international law and international organizations.
Throughout the life of the League of Nations he was a participant in and
an observer of its work. He has been an equally industrious observer, although a less active participant, in the affairs of the United Nations. He is
well qualified to take "a world view" of capital punishment.
The book contains concentric circles of logic. The argument is presented
that capital punishment should be abolished, within the argument that
punishment as a deterrent to crime has failed, within the argument that
world peace cannot be won by killing.
The use of the death penalty as a crime deterrent can be traced to the
beginning of governmental organization having the strength to carry out its
will. The right of the state to take the life of an individual is usually accepted
without question, but from time to time and place to place there have been
extensive-sometimes careful, sometimes bitter-reconsiderations of the
moral and legal correctness of this assumption.
In presenting his considerations Mr. Joyce is untrammeled by the objectivity of the scholar. His writing is that of the advocate and, at times, of
the sensationalist. This point of view is perhaps most apparent in the chapter
devoted to the Chessman affair. There is an attempt to establish several
propositions: that this complex of judicial proceedings and administrative
actions demonstrates the savagery and failure of a society which has capital
punishment; that the Chessman case was replete with judicial errors; that
most of the governmental action was motivated by political and diplomatic
considerations, rather than by considerations of justice for the accused; and
that the news media conditioned the populace to demand vengeance. Whether
or not these propositions are supportable, a large part of the material bears
little relevancy to a discussion of capital punishment. The objectivity of the
opinions expressed becomes suspect when the author devotes but an occasional off-hand phrase and two paragraphs to the statements of those who
find that justice was carried out. The tone of advocacy is demonstrated in
one dismissing sentence: "The basic nature of the Chessman opposition was
not, however, to be found in the law-abidingness of honest men, resolute to
see justice done."' The scholarliness of the work is somewhat diminished by
the rhetoric of this section, for example, the "legal dice were loaded," "legalized burlesque," "political jobbery," "political corruption on every level of
government," "red light mentality," "this Greek Tragedy." It is regrettable
1.
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that the writer's reaction to the Chessman affair caused him to lose sight of
the purpose which is declared by the title of the book and prevented a deep
analysis of that subject. Nonetheless, the author has clearly portrayed the
wide and varied implications which can be present when the death penalty is
imposed.
The history of capital punishment is developed in breadth but not in
detail. The view of the author is that organized society's insistence upon
its right to destroy and to threaten with destruction those who are thought
to oppose or threaten it comes from the sovereign's fear of a danger to its
authority. There is an account of the Hebraic and Biblical records of the
use of the death penalty and of the restraints upon its use. The use then
was, as it still is, closely bound to religious justification. In the Inquisition
there was a recurring although changing relationship between state and
church, the total effect of which was to raise little question as to the basic
legality and morality of the death penalty. In the eighteenth century there
developed an interest in humanizing death. Society could not do without the
death penalty, but society could concern itself with making the execution
what Lepeletier called "the simple deprivation of life," that is to say, the
abolishment of deliberately torturous forms of death. Widespread use of the
guillotine was an important result of this search. In the same century several
influential writers spoke out for abolition, particularly Beccaria in Italy and
Rousseau in France. In the nineteenth century several governments abolished
capital punishment with minor exceptions of a political or military nature.
Oscillation has been the mark of governmental action in modern times.
Although the trend has been toward abolition, there have been significant
refusals to abolish after careful consideration and significant reversals after
abolition was a fact. The legislative development in France and Ceylon are
analyzed to show how a serious crime wave or a single, particularly horrendous crime can cause violent gyrations in popular and governmental
thinking on the subject. Several pages are devoted to an attempt to unravel
the complex of positions on this subject which have existed in Russia. In the
mid-eighteenth century that nation abolished the death penalty except for
political offenses. Since then there have been many times when that early
attitude has been reversed, re-enacted, modified, forgotten.
Although the voice of the advocate is still present, there is a wellbalanced account of events relating to abolition in Britain with special emphasis on the years since 1928, when the first abolition bill was introduced
in the House of Commons. That bill, which had no chance of passage, did
result in a governmental report recommending abolition for an experimental
period of five years. In 1957 a compromise act was passed which limited the
use of the penalty to certain types of murder. The author analyzes the il-
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logical results from the attempt to apply the death penality to some fact
situations and not to others.
Like consideration is given to attitudes and actions in the United States.
Because so many governments have authority to act independently, the picture is one of conflict. Jurisdictions differ to a considerable extent regarding
the death penalty both as to the crimes to which it is applied and as to the
manner in which it is carried out. The attempts over the years at abolition
(which in the author's vocabulary is synonymous with reform) and an
evaluation of the present status of that movement are presented. At the time
of publication 7 states had entirely abolished the penalty. 2 others had
abolished it except for murder committed by a person already in prison
serving a life sentence. In 20 other states the penalty is rarely used, though
permitted. 9 states have at one time or another done away with the
penalty but have later reinstated it. The author's conclusion is that there is
currently a rebirth of interest in abolition.
"Sooner or later capital punishment was bound to become a major issue
at the United Nations."'2 In 1957 a committee of the General Assembly gave
consideration to a covenant which would, inter alia, limit the right of signatories to impose the penalty. The United States and the United Kingdom
summarily indicated their disinterest in such an agreement. Mr. Joyce presents with great care the developing positions that were taken by the other
countries represented. It was clear that the majority regarded protection
of the right to life as a legal obligation of the state but insisted on the right
of the state to take life in clearly defined circumstances. In 1960 the General
Assembly launched "a study of the question of capital punishment, of the
law and practices relating thereto and of the effects of capital punishment,
and the abolition thereof, on the rate of criminality." This material on the
United Nations is valuable because this book is the first to present it.
Mr. Joyce discusses with considerable clarity the literature and theories
which have concluded that punishment has failed as a deterrent to crime,
especially capital punishment for the crime of murder. He demonstrates that
of all types of criminals, murderers are among the least likely to repeat their
crimes. He considers particular types and terms of imprisonment as alternatives to the death penalty and rehabilitation as an alternative to punishment.
In the concluding chapter the author turns to the development of his
earlier announced thesis that "The practice of Capital Punishment within the
state cannot be isolated from the practice of violence by the State in its external relations."'
2. Id. at 194.
3. Id. at 56.
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The rejection of violence as a way of life both for the individual
and the nation, has thus become the essential condition of our
emergent One World civilization. Unless he can collectively repudiate and replace violence as a means of achieving both social
and national defense, Man's continued stay on Planet
Earth is
4
open to grave doubt. The issue is as simple as that.
But is the issue as simple as that? The author observes that "the professional ethics of violence have become . . . a built-in device of both the

so-called Free and the Communist societies." He condemns at great length
the Western World's (especially the United States') maintenance of a position of military strength for what he rather pityingly calls "the notion of a
'holy' war against Communism, carried out with atomic weapons, [which]
can only be justified by warped minds, who have lost touch with reality and
not found religion." 5 Is this author correct when he says we cannot solve
our problems with Russia so long as we negotiate from a position of military
strength? Is he correct when he argues that this country's international
policies are shaped by newspapers which create war panic after war panic?
Would it have been morally right to ignore the Communist activities in
Korea? Have not the leaders of the Free World striven mightily to create
organizations and methods for solving the world tensions by the rule of law
and not by killing? Is Churchill to be marked down as morally wrong when
he called upon the people of England to fight on the beaches and in the streets
when Hitler stood across the Channel? Do not Eisenhower and Kennedy
recognize the utter devastation which would come to this country and to the
world with atomic war? The advocate fails badly in his concluding chapter.
Mr. Joyce assembles in a provocative way much material on capital
punishment, some of which is new. He ignores or dismisses without answer
many carefully considered judgments which differ from his own.
EDGAR I.KING*
4.
5.
*
LL.B.,

Id. at 265.
Id. at 264.
Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law; A.B., 1934, University of Kansas;
1937, University of Kansas; LL.D., 1959, Temple University.

